Section 16(1) of the Review Act explicitly states that ideas expressed in the ADJR Act are not taken to be different in the Review Act merely because different words are used. This was used to indicate the connection between the Review Act and the ADJR Act, and hence it was accepted that where the same words are used then the meaning was also relevantly the same. See Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ conveniently set out what appears to be the ratio of their decision in a single paragraph:
The determination of whether a decision is 'made … under an enactment' involves two criteria: first, the decision must be expressly or impliedly required or authorised by the enactment; and, secondly, the decision must itself confer, alter or otherwise affect legal rights or obligations, and in that sense the decision must derive from the enactment. A decision will only be 'made … under an enactment' if both these criteria are met. It should be emphasised that this construction of the statutory definition does not require the relevant decision to affect or alter existing rights or obligations, and it will be sufficient that the enactment requires or authorises decisions from which new rights or obligations arise. Similarly, it is not necessary that the relevantly affected legal rights owe their existence to the enactment in question. Affection of rights or obligations derived from the general law or statute will suffice. 23 This test -that the decision be authorised by the enactment and affect legal rights or obligations -is essentially derived from the confluence of four lines of authority: 1) whether there is any implied grant of authorisation from a federal statute; 2) whether decisions made under contract or some other private law source may still be made under an enactment; 3) what amounts to a 'matter' arising under a Commonwealth law for the purposes of s 76(ii) of the Constitution; and 4) what constitutes a 'decision' for the purposes of the ADJR Act. The way the majority derived and applied its test in Griffith will therefore have implications for each of these lines of authority. 24 The first line of authority leading to the test set out by the majority relates to whether a statutory condition precedent is dehors 25 the federal statute and hence not required or authorised by it. It starts with Glasson, and whether the decision there in question was made under a Commonwealth or a State Act. In order to provide a subsidy for petroleum products, Commonwealth legislation authorised the establishment of a scheme by which payments would be made to the States for the States to pass on to the distributors of petroleum products. State legislation was required to distribute the payments because the various rates applicable gave preference to part of one State in breach of s 99 of the Commonwealth Constitution.
REQUIRED OR AUTHORISED BY THE ENACTMENT

Glasson v Parkes Rural Distributions Pty Ltd
The Commonwealth scheme set out the conditions for payments to be made, but these conditions were incorporated in the State Act by providing that amounts payable were to be ascertained by officers appointed by the State according to the scheme. The Commonwealth scheme even provided that distributors named in a certificate were 'entitled to be paid by the State'. This was held by the Court not to be enforceable directly and required implementation through State legislation. Where, as in this case, the officer issued a certificate setting out an amount paid in excess of the requirements, the person was liable under s 10 of the State Act to repay that amount to the State, recoverable as a debt due to the State. 26 ' [N]either the Commonwealth Act nor the scheme directly [gave] rights to, or [imposed] obligations on, the distributors.' 27 The issue of the certificate may have been based on criteria set out in the Commonwealth scheme, but the legal effect of the certificate was dependent on a debt accruing under the State Act. The Commonwealth Act and scheme only affected the payments between the States and the Commonwealth. 28 Therefore the Court was involved in an interpretation of the relevant legislation in concluding:
When neither the Commonwealth Act nor the scheme is the source of the power to appoint the decision-maker, or the source of his power to make the decision, or the source of the decision's legal effect, it cannot be said that the decision [to issue a certificate requiring repayment] was made under that enactment. 29 Clearly the constitutional context had an influence on this interpretation. If the decision to issue the certificate in question was made under a Commonwealth enactment it would suggest that the Commonwealth enactment was responsible for the distribution of the payments and hence the legislation would have potentially been constitutionally invalid. Accountability, in the sense of establishing and enforcing the conditions or criteria by which the decisions were made, had to rest with the State. 30 In Mayer, the grant of an entry permit to a non-citizen was conditioned on the 'Minister having determined by instrument in writing' that the applicant had the status of a refugee under the relevant international refugee conventions or protocols. The majority 31 held that this provision was to be construed as impliedly conferring upon the Minister the statutory function of making the particular determination. 32 It had been argued by the government that it was 'an objective fact that there happened to be [a determination of refugee status by the Minister]'. 33 The legislation in question was not the source of authority to make the determination: rather, as was the case before the relevant provisions were put in place, the determination was at the discretion of the executive government. The majority rejected this as a matter of statutory construction based on three factors: 34 (i) there was no other statutory source of authority to make such a determination;
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Mayer
(ii) such an interpretation would mean that there was no obligation on the Minister to even consider the refugee status of an applicant, provide the determination by instrument in writing, or retain administrative responsibility for making such determinations, and hence the legislative provision could be without effective content if there was no authority to make the requisite determination; and (iii) the wording of the relevant provisions suggested that the determination of refugee status should be cotemporaneous with the decision it conditioned, namely the subsequent decision of whether to grant an entry permit. This was in the context of other provisions in the legislation whose function also implied that a determination would be required or authorised by the legislation. Therefore, the majority concluded, 'the Minister's decision was a decision made in the performance of the statutory function which that paragraph impliedly confers upon him' and hence the legislation was 'the source of the power to make the decision'. 35 This was sufficient for the majority to conclude that the determination of refugee status was a decision made under an enactment to which the ADJR Act applied.
Gibbs CJ and Brennan J dissented in separate judgments. They each disagreed with the majority's conclusion that legislative provision provided authority for the Minister to make a determination of the applicant's refugee status, principally on the basis that such a determination was made for the purposes of the government by the Minister under internal administrative arrangements to fulfil Australia's obligations under international law. The dissents were therefore based on a fundamental disagreement as to the objective of the legislative provisions in question, and the extent to which they represented an intent to include protection of refugees as a domestic obligation conditioned by legislation, or merely an intent to formalise or express in legislation some aspects of the existing discretion of the Executive government in fulfilling international obligations.
Both Gibbs CJ and Brennan J went on to consider the domestic legal effect of the determination, pointing out that the determination of refugee status merely conditioned rather than determined the grant of a permanent entry visa. 36 As Brennan J stated: 37 A distinction must be drawn between the legal effect produced by the exercise of a power to produce it when that power is conferred by an enactment and a legal effect which an enactment attaches to the fact that a decision is made in exercise of another authority or power. If an enactment does not confer on a decision-maker the power to produce a particular legal effect but itself creates a legal effect when a decision is made by the decision-maker in exercise of another authority or power, I would regard the decision as made under the other authority or power, not under the enactment. The source of a particular legal effect which follows on the making of a decision is not the enactment which empowers the decision-maker to make the decision unless the power given him by the enactment is a power to produce the legal effect.
In other words, to be made 'under an enactment' the enactment must be both the source of the power to make the decision and the source of the decision's legal effect. Notably Brennan J referred to legal effect, rather then any legal rights and obligations which may only be affected upon the grant or denial of a permanent entry visa. Legal effect is necessary but not sufficient in itself. As Brennan J suggested, it is not enough to imply legislative authority to make a decision merely because of the decision's legal effect: reference must be had to the source of authority, particularly if seeking to derive limitations on the exercise of that authority. The factors relied on by the majority go only to discerning whether the enactment is the implicit source of authority for the decision. As will be discussed below, Brennan J's approach has echoes in that used by the majority in Griffith. 38 The question of implied authority was also at issue in the recent decision in NEAT. Under the Wheat Marketing Act 1989 (Cth) ('1989 Act') a licence for NEAT to export durum wheat could not be issued by the Wheat Export Authority ('WEA') without the written approval of AWB (International) Ltd ('AWBI'), a wholly owned subsidiary of a company incorporated under the Corporations Law and controlled by wheat growers. AWBI refused to give its approval. The majority of McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ held that the decision by AWBI was not subject to invalidation through judicial review. The majority relied on three related considerations: 39
NEAT Domestic Pty Ltd v AWB Ltd
The description of the roles of AWBI and WEA in the relevant provision; 40
(ii) AWBI was a 'private' company in the sense that its decisions were based on its own interests, with corporations law duties to consider the interests of its shareholders; and (iii) It was not possible to impose public law obligations on AWBI while accommodating pursuit of its private interest. It was the first of these that lead the majority to conclude that AWBI's determination to refuse approval was not a decision under an enactment for the purposes of the ADJR Act. 41 It was WEA's decision which was operative and determinative, and hence a decision for the purposes of the ADJR Act. 42 The decision of AWBI was expressed merely as a condition precedent to WEA's decision and AWBI had an independent capacity to act based on its incorporation under the Corporations Law. In those circumstances AWBI could be distinguished from a statutory corporation or an office-holder such as a Minister 43 Oates concerned a provision calling for the Commonwealth Minister's consent to extend the limitation period to bring a prosecution under the corporations law (which relevantly at the time was operating as a law of Western Australia). It was held that the better approach as a matter of construing legislative intent was to conclude that the provision calling for the consent of the Minister implied conferred authority on the Minister to give their consent, because of the legislative history of the provision, and that the Commonwealth's consent to the drawing in of its Ministers into the operation of the State Act was itself conditioned on the relevant corporations law provisions conferring power to make the decision.
necessary nor appropriate to read s 57(3B) as impliedly conferring those powers on AWBI'. 44 In reaching this conclusion the majority relied on there being an alternative statutory source of authority to make the determination, the first of the factors relied on in Mayer. There was no express consideration of the other factors relied on in Mayer.
The legislative history of the 1989 Act indicated that an export licence was conditioned on the approval of AWBI because AWBI, or at least its parent company, was established to represent the interests of wheat growers. Those wheat growers had contributed to a common pool to be able to maximise the price they received for bulk exports of wheat without the threat of domestic competition. It was perhaps open to interpret the relevant legislative provisions as permitting AWBI to remain the sole bulk exporter of wheat, and this could legitimately always outweigh the arguments put by other exporters such as NEAT. Therefore, it was consistent with the legislative intent for AWBI to not even consider other applications for approval and hence, unlike in Mayer, the provision in question could be effective if no authority to make the requisite determination existed. There would also be no obligation on AWBI to make a cotemporaneous determination of each application in the circumstances existing at the time of the determination. It may not have mattered whether the particular application would not of itself have had an immediate material effect if AWBI had formed the view that the consequences for future export negotiations might necessarily be adverse to its shareholders' interests.
Therefore the factors in Mayer, when applied to the situation in NEAT, could be used to indicate that there was no implied grant of authority. The difficulty with this approach, which illustrates a criticism of the general applicability of the factors used in Mayer, is that examining the threshold issue of whether judicial review was available would effectively involve an assessment of whether a ground of review had been breached -whether, as contended by NEAT, there was an obligation on AWBI to assess the merits of NEAT's application. 45 The majority, however, concluded that AWBI was under no obligation to decide whether or not to grant its approval, or to consider the merits of each application, because there was no authorisation for such a decision in the relevant provision. They described the 'merits' of an individual application as 'those matters derived from the context of the 1989 Act and the subject matter, scope or purpose of the Act which are identified as bearing upon the decision'. 46 Wallsend Ltd 47 the context and scope, object and purpose of the legislation were used to determine what relevant considerations the decision-maker was required to take into account. On that basis AWBI would have to consider the merits of an application where the scope, object and purpose of the 1989 Act indicated that, at least in some cases, the grant of approval could not have any bearing on the relevant interests of AWBI. The legislation would act to define the relevant interests of AWBI, and hence impose a limit or condition on the scope of AWBI's authority. The majority, however, separated the literal question of grant of authority from the purposive interpretation of the obligations imposed through such a grant, and in so doing never addressed the question of whether the scope, object or purpose of the Act restricted the interests AWBI was to consider in deciding whether to approve any application. The lack of authorisation implied the conclusion that there were no relevant conditions or restrictions imposed through the legislation.
The outcome in NEAT may have been based on the lack of any obligation imposed on AWBI by the 1989 Act to consider the merits of any individual application once AWBI had legitimately formed the policy that any benefit of a grant of a permit to individual growers would be at the expense of its shareholders. At least in respect of an applicant having to show why this policy should not apply to an individual application, this was the basis on which Gleeson CJ decided that NEAT's claim should be dismissed -there was no breach of the ground of review alleged. 48 The majority in Mayer, however, seemed to conclude that the ADJR Act was not available with respect to any ground of review. They considered whether there could be any public law remedies available, including those available under the ADJR Act, where AWBI purported to fulfil the role which it plays under the 1989 Act. 49 It is not clear whether in doing so they were attempting to pre-empt a discussion of whether there had been any breach of the grounds of review or establishing some threshold, such as the requirement that a decision be made under an enactment for the purposes of ADJR Act review, that had to be reached before any public law remedies were available.
This suggests one of the difficulties associated with the approach taken in cases such as Glasson, Mayer and NEAT. These cases show that the first of the limbs in the Griffith test -that the decision must be expressly or impliedly required or authorised by the enactment rather than merely using the decision as a basis or factum 50 on which to condition another decision -is a matter of statutory interpretation. 51 This process of interpretation involves considering whether there is some basis to imply that the legislation places conditions or limits on the decision in question. The question is then whether such implied conditions include those imposed by the various grounds of review. The role of authorisation in establishing the threshold requirement of the ADJR Act to avoid the need to consider the possible breaches of any grounds of review may therefore be limited. The factum metaphor comes from Hill, 'The Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act and "Under an Enactment"', above n 45, 138, where he points to the cases in the context of constitutionally-required separation of judicial power that have referred to the decision of an administrative body as a 'factum' for creating rights and obligations. 51 See also the discussion by Arora, above n 45.
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AFFECT LEGAL RIGHTS OR OBLIGATIONS
The second line of authority relied on in Griffith looks at cases considering whether decisions involving contract or some other private law source can also be made under an enactment. Of these the two principally relied upon by the majority in Griffith 52 are Chittick v Ackland 53 and Australian National University v Lewins. 54
Chittick v Ackland
Chittick considered whether a decision of the Health Commission to terminate the applicant's employment for improper conduct in breach of the conditions of employment was reviewable under the ADJR Act. The legislation establishing the Health Commission stated that the terms and conditions of employment of those appointed by the Commission 'shall be as determined by the Commission'. The question was whether the instrument setting out the conditions of employment constituted an instrument 'made under an enactment'.
All three judges accepted that an instrument made under an enactment must be one under which administrative decisions can be made. It is not every document or other action of a statutory authority that can give rise to an instrument so as to make decisions made under it reviewable under the ADJR Act. 55 Only instruments that have 'the capacity to affect rights and obligations' can lead to review. Lockhart and Morling JJ stated: the essential quality which in our opinion makes [the conditions of employment] an instrument for the purposes of the Judicial Review Act … [is] the quality of unilaterally affecting the rights and obligations of the Commission's staff. 56 Being able to unilaterally change the terms of a contract of employment meant that it was the Commission's statement of the conditions of employment which bound the employee and hence affected their rights and obligations, as opposed to the consent of the employee to conditions of employment being incorporated into the contractual relationship. 57
Australian National University v Lewins
This need for the capacity to affect legal rights and interests before a decision could be held to be under an enactment was accepted in Lewins, a case concerning whether there was a right to reasons under the ADJR Act for a decision declining promotion under a promotions policy. It was held by Lehane J that:
I cannot see how it is possible to construe a mere power to employ staff as enabling the University unilaterally to vary its contracts with its employees or to impose on them, without their consent, conditions which legally bind them… Thus, unlike the terms and conditions with which Chittick was concerned, I do not think that the statement in question here is one to which the Act gives the capacity to affect See also the discussion in Mair v Bartholomew (1992) 104 ALR 537. ____________________________________________________________________________________ legal rights and obligations -any more than a similar document issued by a private employer would have that capacity. 58 As the majority in Griffith suggested, a decision is not 'made under' the most immediate or proximate source of power to make the decision. 59 The judges in Lewins did not have to decide whether the promotions policy formed part of the contract of employment between the University and Lewins -Lehane J merely referred to any capacity of the policy to be binding as deriving from contract or other private law sources and Davies J suggested that there may be principles of legitimate expectation, estoppel or contract which would entitle Lewins to enforce the policy. Lewins and Chittick may therefore be distinguished from cases such as Australian National University v Burns, 60 where any rights or duties involved were derived from the contract of employment between the University and its employee.
Implications for pre-contractual decisions It was on this basis that the majority in Griffith relied on Lewins to reject Australian Capital Territory Health Authority v Berkeley Cleaning Group Pty Ltd 61 and other decisions relying upon it, 62 such as James Richardson Corporation Pty Ltd v Federal Airports
Corporation 63 as having 'proceeded on an incorrect interpretation of the ADJR Act'. 64 In Berkeley a decision to award a contract to a successful tenderer was held to be a decision made under an enactment. The decision-maker in question, the Health Authority, had no capacity to enter into contracts other than through its empowering legislation, and hence there was no question that the authority to enter into the contract came from the legislation in question. The Court suggested that in those circumstances any subsequent decision would be referable to the enactment unless there had been 'some change in legal circumstances, which makes it proper to refer the decision to the product of the change, rather than the original source of power'. 65 It did not matter that the capacity to contract was expressed in general rather than specific terms.
General Newspapers v Telstra 66 was similarly based on a decision which preceded entering into a contract, in this case a decision not to call for tenders before contracting for the printing of telephone directories. However, Berkeley and Richardson were not followed. Davies and Einfeld JJ held that to be a 'decision' for the purposes of the ADJR Act required an 'ultimate or operative determination which has force and effect by virtue of an enactment.' 67 They stated that:
A contract entered into by a corporation under a general power to enter into contracts is not given force and effect by the empowering statute. 
67
Ibid 173. This is based on the decision in Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321, which is discussed further below.
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Volume 33 ____________________________________________________________________________________ confers capacity to contract, whilst the validity and effect of the contract is determined by the ordinary laws of contract. 68 The majority in Griffith referred to this in requiring that legal rights and obligations be affected not under the general law, including the laws governing contracts, but by virtue of the statute. 69 Davies and Einfeld JJ in General Newspapers went on to say:
It is unnecessary to consider the exceptional case where it may be proper to bring a proceeding under the ADJR Act because an act or thing, such as a contract, may have been entered into for an ulterior purpose, such as private gain, and the validity of the act is challenged by reference to the statute under the general aegis of which the act or thing is done. If the challenge to validity is made by reference to a federal enactment, then the challenge may be appropriate, even in relation to a contract, because the statute affects the force and effect of that which was done. 70 They gave, as an example of where the challenge may be made by reference to the federal enactment, the case of Gerah Imports Pty Ltd v Minister for Industry, Technology and Commerce. 71 In Gerah Imports there was a suggestion that conditions imposed on the tender process may have affected the validity of any contract subsequently entered into where the establishment of conditions was specifically authorised and limited under the relevant legislation. The impact of legislative conditions on the exercise of what may otherwise be a generally expressed power was also discussed in Burns, where Bowen CJ and Lockhart J suggested that the existence of procedural and other restrictions on the exercise of power to employ someone would be reviewable because, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the legislation, and not the contract of employment, would then be the relevant source of the decision. 72 These references to validity of a decision to enter into a contract allude to the possibility acknowledged in cases such as Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Redmore Pty Ltd, 73 that the power to enter into a contract may be conditioned upon fulfilment of some procedural or other substantive requirement whose breach may, depending on the legislative intent of the consequences of breach of the requirement, have the consequences of rendering the contract void. 74 regulating the entering into of contracts which do not result in the invalidity of the contract. 75 As Brennan and Dawson JJ suggested in Redmore:
There is a natural reluctance to attribute an unjust operation to a statute which does not expressly prohibit a contract of a particular class when a party who enters into such a contract in breach of the statute relies on the statute to avoid his contractual obligations. Whether the statute has that operation depends on its purpose. If the purpose of prohibiting entry by a party into contracts of a particular class is the protection of the public interest and if the purpose would be frustrated by giving effect to contracts of that class, the statute sterilizes those contracts. The public interest prevails over the private interest of the contracting parties. 76 The invalidity of any action taken without complying with requisite procedures therefore depends on an interpretation of legislative intent, in which the consensual nature of the entry into contracts and hence the limited capacity to affect rights and interests would be taken into account. Whether the requirements condition the capacity to enter into the contract, or merely regulate that process without leading to invalidity if breached, involves an assessment of the consequences of invalidity and the extent that they are consistent with the purpose of the legislative provisions. 77 The requirement for a decision to be made under an enactment may, on this analysis, depend upon whether the legislation provides for the basis on which the contract is to be entered into, or in some other way conditions the entry into the contract in a way that non-compliance would otherwise lead to invalidity of the contract. A decision that the basis is satisfied or the conditions have been fulfilled may therefore be reviewable under the ADJR Act, provided the first condition is met and the decision is required or authorised by the enactment and not based on the inherent power of the executive to exercise the capacities of a natural person. 78 One response to this argument is that invalidity of a contract does not necessarily affect rights and obligations in the way referred to by the majority in Griffith. The validity of the contract or the decision to enter into a contract does not change the fact that parties to the contract were only bound through the ability to enforce the contract rather than the statute. It is the potential effect of the decision made under the enactment and not the effect of enforcing conditions on the making of that decision which is the relevant consideration. The consensual nature of the impact on individual rights and obligations is not changed by establishing limitations on the ability of the decision-maker to enter into the relevant relationship. The Federal Court may only have jurisdiction to consider questions of the validity of contracts entered into by 
MATTERS ARISING UNDER A COMMONWEALTH ENACTMENT
The third line of authority used by the majority in Griffith is the analogy with cases considering the meaning of 'matters' 'arising under' a Commonwealth enactment for the purposes of s 76(ii) of the Constitution. Section 76(ii) of the Constitution provides for jurisdiction to be conferred on the High Court in any matter 'arising under' any laws made by the Commonwealth Parliament. 80 a matter may properly be said to arise under a Federal law if the right or duty in question in the matter owes its existence to Federal law or depends upon Federal law for its enforcement, whether or not the determination of the controversy involves the interpretation (or validity) of the law. 82 As an example the majority in Griffith referred 83 to LNC Industries v BMW (Australia) Ltd, 84 where a trust over import quotas, a form of property created by a federal law, was enough to provide federal jurisdiction under s 39(2) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) to apply the general law relating to trusts. The fact that the subject matter of the trust was created by federal law was enough.
The principle in Barrett was used by the majority in Griffith to support the second limb of their test for when a decision is made under an enactment. It is the affecting of legal rights and obligations that merits the statutory right of judicial review. 85 Those legal rights and obligations may be founded in the general or unwritten law and affected in some way by the decision in question, 86 or may be statutory in the sense of having come into existence or continued as a result of the decision made under an enactment as opposed to under a contract or some other private law source. 87 As the majority in Griffith put the question to be asked, '[d]o legal rights or duties owe in an immediate sense their existence to the decision, or depend upon the presence of the decision for their enforcement?' 88 The majority referred to the 'character of the ADJR Act as a law of the Commonwealth which confers federal jurisdiction to hear and determine applications for review' in supporting the criteria they use to determine whether a decision is made Ibid 744 [80] . The reference to 'in an immediate sense' seems to refer to the need to establish the legislation as the source of the capacity to bind the parties rather than merely regulating the contractual or other private law obligation entered into consensually.
under an enactment. 89 It is not clear whether the majority intended to imply that the validity of the conferral of jurisdiction by the ADJR Act depends upon the decision under review itself constituting a 'matter'. Graeme Hill has suggested that the ADJR Act itself, as a Commonwealth law, can give rise to the requisite matter:
To
It is therefore likely that the reference to 'matter' by the majority in Griffith is most useful as an analogy in supporting the requirement that a decision affect 'rights and obligations' and hence can provide guidance, albeit limited, on what is meant by that term.
In In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts, 92 the majority of the Court said:
In Briefly, if the decision is made under a Commonwealth Act, then the application of the ADJR Act will be supported by whatever head of power supports that Commonwealth Act. If the decision is made under a State Act, then the application of the ADJR Act will be supported by whatever head of power supports the Commonwealth law authorising the Commonwealth body to perform the State function, and possibly by the Commonwealth's inherent executive power to regulate the conduct of its own officers and bodies. 
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In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts was used in Ainsworth 96 to hold that 'declaratory relief must be directed to the determination of legal controversies and not to answering abstract or hypothetical questions'. 97 A declaration was available in Ainsworth to declare that a report had been published in breach of the obligations of natural justice, even though the report had no legal effect. The effect of the publication on a person's reputation, and the possibility that a declaration might alleviate that effect in some way, was sufficient for a declaration to be issued. Ainsworth was a decision on appeal from a State supreme court 98 and as it did not involve federal jurisdiction did not necessarily have to involve a 'matter'. 99 However, the Court referred to the availability of prohibition in such circumstances, had relief been sought prior to publication of the report, regardless of the lack of legal effect of the report. The availability of prohibition required that there had been a jurisdictional error, with no requirement to classify the legal effect of the decision.
It allegation of want of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction [was] made and there is, therefore, no controversy, no "matter", concerning the authority of the judge to decide the issues that were decided'. 103 Determining the validity of legislation under s 109 of the Constitution was held in Re McBain to be a 'matter' in circumstances where there was no attempt to enforce the legislation in question. The matter related to 'a privilege or immunity from the requirement to observe the State law in question. The citizen is "entitled to know" whether that law is binding'. 104 The reliance on rights and obligations inherent in the definition of 'matter' may be compared with the broadening of standing requirements beyond a strict rights-based approach. In Bateman's Bay Local Aboriginal Land Council v The Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty Ltd 105 it was held that a commercial competitor had standing to seek an injunction to restrain the activities of a statutory authority acting ultra vires in the discharge of public funds. Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ held that equitable remedies are not available solely to protect a proprietary or other legal right advanced by a plaintiff. 106 Anyone with a sufficient material interest, subject to legislative intent to the contrary, could have standing to compel observance by statutory authorities of statutory limitations placed upon their activities. 107 Equitable remedies may therefore be seen to complement remedies such as prohibition. As Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ suggested:
there is a body of authority that, even in the absence of a legal interest, 'a stranger' to an industrial dispute has standing as a prosecutor to seek prohibition under s 75(v) of the Constitution although in such cases the discretion to refuse the remedy may be greater than would otherwise be the case. 108 The reference to prohibition and statutory limitations suggests that this broadening of standing may be restricted to issues of jurisdictional error or at least in circumstances where breach of preconditions on the valid exercise of power are in issue. There is therefore a link with this issue and the 'exceptional case' leading to invalidity identified in General Newspapers and Redmore. 109 Even if it is accepted that standing is also broadened in the case of nonjurisdictional errors it is not clear what influence this has over the definition of 'matter' and hence to the understanding of the meaning of 'rights and obligations' in the context of whether a decision was made 'under an enactment' for the purposes of the ADJR Act. It may be that '[w]here the issue is whether federal jurisdiction has been invoked with respect to a "matter", questions of "standing" are subsumed within that issue'. 110 There is a need to identify the interest of the person seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction. However, the majority in Griffith separated the issues of whether a decision was made 'under an enactment' and standing. 'It is the first which is the precondition for the second, not vice versa.' 111 Therefore, although a person may be aggrieved for the purposes of enlivening the ADJR Act even though their rights and obligations may not be affected by the decision, that was not used by the majority as an indication that a decision may be 'under an enactment'. It may remain possible, however, for a broad range of interests to allow standing to challenge a decision that has the requisite effect: the decision may be challenged by a person aggrieved so long as it affects someone's, and possibly someone else's, rights and obligations.
DECISIONS AND THE MEANING OF 'RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS'
Perhaps if an analogy is to be made between 'decisions made' under an enactment referred to in the ADJR Act and 'matters arising' under an enactment in s 76(ii) of the Constitution it should be between the meanings of 'decision' and 'matter'. 112 There have been a number of cases that have refused relief on the basis that the lack of any operative and determinative effect upon a person's rights, interests or legitimate expectations meant there was no 'decision' for the purposes of the ADJR Act. 113 
For example, in Electricity Supply Association of Australia Ltd v Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission 114 Finn J considered the issue of media releases by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ('ACCC') expressing the opinion that electricity suppliers may be liable to their customers under the supply contracts for damage from power surges. He held that these were not reviewable under the ADJR Act for reasons including that they were not 'decisions': they 'were not decisions of a substantive nature. … They neither gave rights to a consumer nor imposed obligations upon a supplier, though they expressed opinions in relation to rights and obligations'. 115 These cases considering the meaning of 'decision' are based on the well-known judgment of Mason J in Bond 116 where he stated: 'a reviewable "decision" is one for which provision is made by or under a statute. That will generally, but not always, entail a decision which is final or operative and determinative, at least in a practical sense, of the issue of fact falling for consideration ' 'Decisions' involve substantive determinations, 118 whereas 'conduct' involves procedures adopted for the purpose of making a reviewable decision. 119 Bond concerned various decisions relating to the fitness of licence-holders to hold broadcasting licences. A finding that a licence-holder was not a fit and proper person was merely an intermediate determination made on the way to deciding whether to revoke or suspend the licences or impose conditions on them, but it was a 'matter of substance for which the statute provided as an essential preliminary to the making of the ultimate decision'. 120 However, findings that Mr Bond was not a fit and proper person were in themselves not reviewable, as issues relating to his control over the licence-holders had to be resolved, and their examination would have to wait until a reviewable decision was reached.
The policy reason behind this restriction on the definition of 'decision' is set out earlier in the decision:
The relevant policy considerations are competing. On the one hand, the purposes of the [ADJR Act] are to allow persons aggrieved by the administrative decision-making processes of government a convenient and effective means of redress and to enhance those processes. On the other hand, in so far as the ambit of the concept of 'decision' is extended, there is a greater risk that the efficient administration of government will be impaired. …To interpret 'decision' in a way that would involve a departure from the quality of finality would lead to a fragmentation of the processes of administrative decision-making and set at risk the efficiency of the administrative process. 121 As suggested by the majority in Griffith, this reasoning 'apparently responded to an apprehension of misuse of the statutory review system by challenges at intermediate stages of decision-making processes'. 122 The need to prevent undue fragmentation of the decision-making process does not, however, justify placing restrictions on review based on the end result of the decision-making process such as through restricting ADJR Act review to rights and obligations at the expense of interests and perhaps If a general authorisation in a statute for a decision by an organisation set up under that legislation is sufficient to make it a decision under the statute, and thus open to judicial review, every intra vires action of that organisation that has decisional effect and every kind of conduct engaged in by it for the purpose of making a decision will be examinable by the court. The potential for massive disruption of the organisation's activities that would be the consequence of such a conclusion is manifest: at 143. However, this justification merely refers to the need for there to be some restriction on the review of intra vires activities, leaving the basis for the distinction between intra and ultra vires activities unclear.
legitimate expectations. 123 The issue therefore arises here, as in the other lines of authority referred to above, as to the meaning of 'rights and obligations'. 124 The majority in Griffith gave an indication of the potential breadth of the meaning of 'rights and obligations' when they referred to the judgment of Toohey and Gaudron JJ in Bond. Toohey and Gaudon JJ disagreed with the characterisation by Mason J of a 'decision' involving a 'substantive determination'. 125 The ambit of review under the ADJR Act was instead restricted by the decision having to be made 'under an enactment', 126 which required that the decision was required or authorised by an enactment, including being a condition precedent to the exercise of a substantive power. The majority in Griffith expanded on this in giving as an example of statutory rights and obligations: a requirement, as a condition precedent to the exercise of a substantive statutory power to confer or withdraw rights (for example, a licence), that a particular finding be made. The decision to make or not to make that finding controls the coming into existence or continuation of the statutory licence and itself is a decision under an enactment. 127 Both Mason CJ and the minority of Toohey and Gaudron JJ in Bond included an 'essential preliminary to the making of the ultimate decision' 128 or 'condition precedent to the exercise of a substantive statutory power' 129 as a reviewable decision under the ADJR Act. As the majority in Griffith suggested, the elements of 'decision', 'of administrative character', and 'made under an enactment' are interrelated and there are dangers in looking at the definition as other than a whole. 130 While the majority in Griffith appeared to support the approach of Toohey and Gaudron JJ in Bond, 131 upon either approach the issue is whether the legislation provides for a precondition to the exercise of substantive statutory power.
Therefore the ultimate conferral of a licence is a decision which may affect legal rights for the purpose of the ADJR Act. The majority in Griffith also refer to the decisions in Mayer and NEAT to suggest that grants of an entry permit or licence to export wheat are 'rights' for the purposes of determining whether a decision is made 'under an enactment'. 132 124 While no definition of 'rights and obligations' is given in the judgments, for the purposes of exposition, describing the range of entitlements and privileges that may be affected by administrative decisions may include rights as something that can be legally enforced (for example property rights enforceable through trespass and conversion -see the majority in ibid 745 [85]), interests as existing benefits that require lawful authority before they can be taken away, and legitimate expectation as the conferral of a benefit where there has been a representation by the decision-maker which suggests that the benefit will be conferred subject only to special or unusual circumstances. something that would otherwise be prohibited and hence in that way may be characterised as a 'right' to carry out the activity, that characterisation may also describe the 'right' to claim the benefit of a degree upon it having been awarded by the University. 133 It is therefore not the nature of the subject matter or the ultimate effect of the legislation that is in question but rather the source of the conditions achieving that effect. In this way the reference to 'rights' may not be in the sense of being legally enforceable but rather having legal effect. There would appear to be no need to establish that the existence of a particular condition mandates the bestowal of the ultimate benefit in issue. If this is correct, then the majority were not inconsistent with the expansion of the scope of judicial review beyond a strictly rights-based approach generally established in R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board; Ex parte Lain 134 where Lord Diplock stated:
True it is that a determination of the [Criminal Injuries Compensation Board] that a particular sum by way of ex gratia payment of compensation should be offered to an applicant does not give the applicant any right to sue either the board or the Crown for that sum. But it does not follow that a determination of the board in favour of an applicant is without any legal effect upon the rights of the applicant to whom it relates. It makes lawful a payment to an applicant which would otherwise be unlawful. 135 Therefore, on this analysis, the restriction of the ADJR Act to rights and obligations will rarely involve classification of the subject matter of the decision. The decision must merely be a condition precedent to the legal effect or valid exercise of power provided for in the legislation.
THE PROBLEMS WITH CONSENT
The majority in Griffith held that the decision of the University to exclude Ms Tang from the PhD program did not satisfy the second limb of the test they proposed. The majority agreed with counsel for the University's submission that:
there had subsisted between the parties no legal rights and obligations under private law which were susceptible of affection by the decisions in question. There was at best a consensual relationship, the continuation of which was dependent upon the presence of mutuality. 136 Therefore, because the relationship between the University was based on mutual consent rather than any legally classified relationship, the decision had no legal effect. If the University and Ms Tang had been in a contractual arrangement, then the question would have arisen whether the decision to exclude her unilaterally altered those contractual rights through a power sourced from the legislation, 137 or whether it was merely an exercise of contractual rights with any breach subject to redress through contract law. It was accepted by the parties 138 that there was no contractual relationship between the University and Ms Tang. There being no identifiable limits on the basis of the relationship that could be sourced from the legislation, the only remaining relationship was one of mutual consent.
It was suggested earlier in this comment that the role of 'under an enactment' is to ensure that it is the Commonwealth statute which conditions or determines the limits on the decision-making power. To be reviewable, the imposition of conditions on the authority to make decisions cannot be based on the conduct of the parties or implied through the effect a decision has on a particular individual. In this way, to the extent that any obligation of natural justice is not derived from the legislative source of the decision, it in itself cannot give rise to the availability of ADJR Act review.
The majority in Griffith were prepared to accept that the University's policies may have created an expectation that any exclusion would only be after fair treatment of any complaints against Ms Tang. However, that in itself created 'no substantive rights under the general law, the affecting of which rendered the decisions she challenged decisions made under the [relevant legislation]'. 139 The majority therefore reinforced the limited role of legitimate expectations in founding an obligation of natural justice, at least where the expectation arises from the conduct of the decision-maker rather than statutory limits on denial of a possible benefit. The case was argued on the assumption that the appellant was entitled to invoke and apply its policies in relation to academic misconduct, and its procedures for deciding whether academic misconduct had occurred and for internal review of such a decision. The precise legal basis of that common assumption was not examined in argument. There is no reason to doubt that the assumption is correct: at 729 [17]. In similar circumstances there may indeed be a contractual relationship between the university and its students: see 145 Note that Kiefel J, in finding that the promotions policy was not capable of affecting legal rights and obligations in the sense referred to in Chittick (1984) 1 FCR 254, went on to suggest the policy 'does not impact upon the interests of the applicant even if one extends be enough to satisfy the requirement for a decision to be made 'under an enactment '. 146 This understanding of the limited role of legitimate expectations may also be reflected in the meaning of 'matter' to the extent it reflects the separation of powers inherent in the Constitution. As McHugh and Gummow JJ suggest in Lam:
An aspect of the rule of law under the Constitution is that the role or function of Ch III courts does not extend to the performance of the legislative function of translating policy into statutory form or the executive function of administration ... This demarcation is manifested in the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error which informs s 75(v). 147
Therefore, while the concept of 'matter' is not necessarily limited to legally enforceable rights it may not extend to the enforcement of expectations based on representations that are not sourced in legislation or have no legal effect. In any event, it seems clear that it is not sufficient to establish the availability of review under the ADJR Act to demonstrate that there is a legitimate expectation that may give rise to a breach of natural justice.
The obligation of natural justice is not dependent on there being a statutory source of the power to make a decision. There might be an obligation of natural justice implied through the consensual nature of the relationship between the partiescourts have long accepted that natural justice can be implied into a contractual relationship, for example 148 -or because of the legislative grant of power to make an adjudication. The existence of an obligation of natural justice therefore does not provide any indication of the source of that obligation, and hence is not sufficient for review under the ADJR Act. There is a distinction between conduct creating expectations about how a private power may be exercised and conduct creating expectations about the exercise of a power which affects rights and obligations. Thus a policy that limits the circumstances in which a legal right or obligation will be affected may create an obligation of natural justice, but it is the existence of the effect on legal rights which is required before the decision can be reviewed under the ADJR Act. But similarly, the lack of any contractual obligation leaves little basis for natural justice to be implied. The consensual basis of the relationship between the University and Ms Tang means that there may be no basis on which any obligation of natural justice may arise.
The problem with reliance on consensual submission to describe the relationship between the University and Ms Tang is determining what has been consented to. Ms Tang may have consented to becoming a PhD student on the basis that the misconduct _____________________________________________________________________________________ that to benefits or privileges held or which might accrue to him, as the term "legitimate expectations" in its original sense referred': ibid 96. Thus Kiefel J drew a distinction between legitimate expectations of receiving a benefit based on the limited conditions of its denial in the legislation and expectations based on the conduct or policy of the decisionmaker or executive government. 146 It is not the breach of a ground of review in ss 5-7 of the ADJR Act that leads to a decision being made under an enactment. As Kiefel J suggested: ibid 97, the necessary link between the decision and an enactment cannot be supplied by the ADJR Act itself. policy and its implications of fairness would be adhered to. The limits of consent therefore depend on how those limits can be enforced or remedied. The relationship is consensual in the sense that limits on the authority to make decisions come from the agreement of the parties and the nature of the relationship rather than being imposed through the legislation. The approach of the majority in Griffith suggests that those limits are to be enforced through contract, or estoppel, or some other private law remedy. They are not enforced through declaring the limits of the decision implied through the statute.
Therefore, the determination of when is there a 'consensual submission to jurisdiction' depends on an assessment of the source of the limits imposed on the decision-maker. A finding that the relationship is consensual reflects a conclusion as to the source of the limits to that relationship. As with the question of whether a decision is authorised by an enactment, ultimately this assessment involves a process of statutory interpretation, attempting to discern an intention to imply limitations on the exercise of authority without regard to the actual effect of the decision in question. It is not a question of determining what the respective limits are (and indeed they may be very similar regardless of whether the body is classified as public or private), but rather which source of limitations is more appropriately referred to as holding the body accountable: to whom is the body to be held to account. 149 This therefore involves a priori assumptions about the nature of the body and the decisions in question and whether it is more appropriate that the body be held accountable through public or private law remedies, or, as possibly in this case, neither. 150
WHAT MAKES UNIVERSITIES DIFFERENT
The Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) under which review was sought in Griffith is different from the ADJR Act in a significant respect, though not one that was in issue in this case. Commission, 152 motivated in part by schemes such as the criminal injuries compensation scheme discussed in Lain. 153 The recommendation adapted one made by the Administrative Review Council to similarly extend the ambit of the ADJR Act because 'the funding of such schemes … gives them the same public interest character as they would have if they were the subject of other legislation enacted in the public interest'. 154 The presence of this alternative class of reviewable decisions was not relied upon by the parties in Griffith 155 but was used by Kirby J to suggest that the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) is intended to have a 'large ambit'. 156 The need for such a provision, however, reinforces the conclusion in Burns 157 that it is not every decision of a statutory authority, even one using public funds such as the University, that is made 'under' the enactment which establishes the authority. 158 Some additional element is required.
For the majority in Griffith the additional element was the binding effect on the rights and obligations of individuals. However, it is hard to see how rights and obligations in any strict sense could be affected by a scheme to expend public funds without legislative backing as suggested by s 4(b). This supports the proposition that the majority were concerned with the appropriate source of the limits on the conferral of power rather than characterising the decision as affecting rights or obligations.
For Kirby J that additional element related to the nature of the power to make the decision. His test for whether a decision was made under an enactment was: first determining whether the lawful source of the power to make the 'decision' lies in the enactment propounded and, secondly, deciding whether an individual would, apart from that source, have the power outside of the enactment (either under the common law or by some other statute) to make the 'decision' concerned. 159 Thus a decision can be reviewed if it is not possible to make the decision without the power conferred by the statute in question. For Kirby J the justification for judicial review is the special effect the decision has. An unauthorised non-university provider of courses of higher education was prohibited from conferring a 'higher education award' such as the PhD in question in Griffith. 160 The power to confer the degree, and necessarily, Kirby J argued, the power to deny access to such a degree, was therefore gained because of the conferral on Griffith University of its status as a university by the Griffith University Act 1998 (Qld). The decision to exclude Ms Tang from the PhD program was therefore made under the Griffith University Act 1998 (Qld).
The 'alternative sources of power to make a decision' test adopted by Kirby J was also adopted in Scharer v State of New South Wales 161 by Davies AJA to which Gleeson CJ referred in Griffith: 162 'The crux of the issue in each case is whether the enactment has played a relevant part in affecting or effecting rights or obligations. A grant of authority to do that which under the general law a person has authority to do is not regarded as sufficient.' Gleeson CJ criticised this as a freestanding test:
it suffers from the defect that the answer to the question posed may depend upon the level of abstraction at which the decision, or its legal effect, is described. Any member of the public cannot admit a person to, or exclude a person from, a PhD course, much less a PhD course at Griffith University. On the other hand, any member of the public can enter into a voluntary association with another person, and (subject to any relevant legal constraints) terminate that association. 163 This difficulty can also be seen in the apparent operation of s 4(b) of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld). Presumably any person can expend money in a non-statutory scheme, they just may not be able to use funds appropriated by the Queensland Parliament to pay for it. Gleeson CJ, however, did not provide a reason why review should not be available if the test applies at some level of abstraction.
Nor did Gleeson CJ rely on distinguishing the source of the power to make the decision. For Gleeson CJ the decision to end the relationship was not made under the Griffith University Act 1998 (Qld) because it was not given 'legal force and effect' by that Act. 164 This conclusion was also used by the majority in their conclusion that '[t]he decisions did not affect legal rights and obligations. They had no impact upon matters to which the [Griffith University Act 1998 (Qld)] gave legal force and effect.' 165 As this reference to legal force and effect suggests, however, the tests adopted by Gleeson CJ and the majority may potentially be broader than that adopted by Kirby J -it is not necessary for the effect of the decision to be different to that available to others in the community or from some other source.
The difference in the application to the facts in the judgments in Griffith comes down to a characterisation of the relationship between the University and Ms Tang. Kirby J emphasised the broader context of that relationship: 'the public character of the university as a statutory authority substantially supported by public funds [and] the devastating consequences of the university "decision" on the immediate and long-term career and reputation of the respondent' 166 given the restrictions on who can confer a degree. Thus Kirby J based his characterisation on protecting the interests of individuals such as Ms Tang who are aggrieved by the decision. The majority, however, focused on the extent to which the legislation itself binds the parties and establishes the bounds of their relationship. Characterisation of the regulatory context is largely left unexpressed. The main coercive element in the legislative context is the prohibition on claiming to have a degree unless you have one conferred by a body such as Griffith University. None of the judgments of the High Court discuss how exclusion from the PhD program at one university translates to being unable to undertake a similar program at another university. The basis of the 'devastating consequences' referred to by Kirby J is therefore not examined. Similarly the University is given the express power to enact university statutes 167 which have the status of subordinate legislation. 168 University statutes can be made about various matters including the disciplining of students, 169 and the imposition, recovery and enforcement of penalties. 170 However, there was no suggestion in the judgments that there is any requirement for statutes to be the exclusive means by which these various matters can be regulated by the University. Allowing judicial review of policies developed to guide decisions made by various university committees may undermine the express legislative provision for university statutes and their binding effect.
The regulatory context may therefore be interpreted as focused on ensuring degrees are only conferred when the university considers the student is entitled to it. The standards by which universities are to make that assessment are left to the universities themselves, relying on other incentives that maintain the integrity of the degree as a representation of competence, such as the reputation of the university and its ability to attract students and funding. It is this context that could perhaps justify the majority's conclusion that the relationship between university and student has been left to university and student, enforced through private law remedies, if any, and not relevantly limited by the legislation establishing the university, or any other relevant legislation. 171 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 167 Griffith University Act 1998 (Qld) s 61. See ibid 725-6 [6], 756 [132] . Note that the issue of a university statute would not be of administrative character and hence not be reviewable under the ADJR Act until a decision has been made under that statute. 168 Griffith University Act 1998 (Qld) s 62. 169 Griffith University Act 1998 (Qld) s 61(2)(c). 170 Griffith University Act 1998 (Qld) s 61(3). 171 Note that the Higher Education Support Act 2003 (Cth) in s 2(1)(b) recognises that 'universities are established under laws of the Commonwealth, the States and the Territories that empower them to achieve their objectives as autonomous institutions through governing bodies that are responsible for both the university's overall performance and its ongoing independence'. As conditions on Commonwealth funding universities are required to have in place and comply with grievance and review procedures for student complaints on academic matters (ss 19-45) and must comply (under s 16(25)) with National Protocols for Higher Education Approval Processes (first endorsed by the Ministerial Council on Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs on 31 March 2000), as in force from time to time, which include the requirement that the university have governance, procedural rules, organisation and admission policies which are sufficient to ensure the integrity of the institution's academic programs (National Protocol 1.14). Note that it is not suggested that these requirements would result in a decision to exclude a PhD student being made under the 
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CONCLUSION
Universities may be public institutions developed to achieve public purposes. They are generally established through legislation, attract public funding and provide a service which is of both individual and societal benefit. They play an important, in some contexts exclusive, role in providing qualifications that are extensively relied upon in many forms of accreditation. However, that is not sufficient to give rise to judicial review under the ADJR Act and its State and Territory equivalents. There may be alternative bases for judicial review of university decisions such as the one which excluded Ms Tang that do not depend on the link with legislation to found the court's jurisdiction. However, the question before the court in Griffith was whether there was a decision made 'under an enactment', and it is the reference to legislative authority and the nature of that authority that conditions the availability of ADJR Act review.
The threshold requirement for a decision to be made under an enactment acts as a limitation on the availability of judicial review. As the majority in Griffith made clear, it is not enough to establish that there are restrictions or requirements placed on the making of a decision through the operation of the various grounds of review. 172 The courts must distinguish between the various sources of restrictions in identifying circumstances where the legislation provides the relevant basis for judicial assessment against those grounds. The decision must therefore be authorised by the legislation in the sense that the legislation conditions the decision in question, and have an effect on rights and obligations derived from the legislation rather than the consent of the parties to a mutual relationship.
The requirement that a decision confer, alter or otherwise affect legal rights or obligations before it is 'made … under an enactment' for the purposes of the ADJR Act may include, in some circumstances, that the decision is a condition precedent to the valid exercise of authority conferred by an enactment. At least in situations where it is not clear that a right or obligation is in issue, review under the ADJR Act may involve considerations similar to those involved in establishing that the alleged error in question goes to jurisdiction. However, in the context of review under the ADJR Act at least, these considerations are the product of statutory interpretation. As the various cases examined in this comment have suggested, the process of statutory interpretation can be wide-ranging, encompassing many of the issues that may otherwise arise in considering whether a decision is sufficiently public to give rise to the prerogative writs or other public law remedies. 173 Regardless of whether the end result may be _____________________________________________________________________________________ 172 Margaret Allars, using justiciability to include the threshold hurdles to access to review discussed here, has commented on NEAT by suggesting:
The reasoning in this confusing and contradictory world of justiciability is premised on an assumption that there exists a category of decisions which are intra vires but not justiciable. Yet the very point of justiciability is to enable it to be established whether or not a decision is intra vires. The assumption permits a penumbra of power to enjoy the protection of some kind of relationship with an enactment, without the lawfulness of its exercise being capable of being tested under the ADJR Act: Allars, above n 45, 139. I would disagree that the threshold hurdles are appropriately classified as going to justiciability in the sense of whether a decision was within power or not in breach of a ground of review. 173 For a discussion of whether the decision in Griffith may be reviewed on the basis of the availability of prerogative writs and equitable remedies outside of the ADJR Act context, similar, at least where the decision-maker is established by legislation, the requirement that a decision be made under an enactment means that the starting point is always the interpretation of the conditions imposed by legislation. The need to identify the relevant source of authority inherent in the ADJR Act threshold requirements may reflect various concerns. As cases such as Glasson 174 indicate, allocating responsibility to the appropriate level of government is an important feature of the jurisdictional hurdles to judicial review, whether under the ADJR Act or other avenues such as s 75 of the Constitution, or the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). Similarly the threshold hurdles require allocating responsibility between the legislature and the executive, and require the court to determine the mechanism by which the executive is held to account. To suggest that executive action should be subject to explicit authorisation by the legislature, whether in general or in a particular instance, is to make a normative assessment of the appropriate mechanism of accountability governing any particular decision. The difficulty remains for the courts to justify making such assessments, particularly where the effect may be to limit the availability of judicial review altogether. The legitimacy of judicial review requires more than imposing threshold hurdles to perhaps avoid the expense and delay of judicial review where the prospects of success are remote without explicit consideration of the basis on which that assessment is made. 
